This paper presents a class of preferences that yield closed-form solutions tc dynamic stochastic choice problems. These preferences are based on a set of axioms that were proposed by Kreps and Porteus. The Kreps-Porteus axioms allow one to separate an agent's attitudes to risk from his or her intertemporal elasticity of substitution. RINCE preferences have the properties of RIsk Neutrality and Constant Elasticity of substitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many instances of stochastic intertemporal choice problems that one would like to be able to solve in closed form. But it is generally recognized that, if one maintains the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM), such problems quickly become intractable. In this paper I show that a slight weakening of the VNM axioms that were originally explored by Kreps and Porteus [1978 , 1979a , 1979b ] (henceforth KP) allows one to find a convenient parameterization of utility that may be explicitly solved to yield closed-form decision rules. These decision rules determine optimal actions as functions of current state variables and of the expected values of certain functions of future state variables.
The parametric structure that I propose exploits the fact that KP preferences are able to separate an agent's attitudes to risk from his or her intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This separation allows one to make the simplifying assumption that agents are indifferent to income risk, while maintaining a nontrivial preference for the time at which consumption occurs. A decision maker with the preferences that I describe is risk neutral, in the above sense, but he or she displays a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution in environments where there is no uncertainty. For this reason, I refer to these preferences as Risk Neutral Constant Elasticity, abbreviated as RINCE.
Consider the problem faced by a mortal consumer who must make a finite sequence of savings decisions when the future is uncertain. In the standard representation of this problem, one assumes that rational choice is characterized by the solution to a dynamic programming problem of the following type: The function U T i3tu(ct) may be interpreted as VNM utility function defined over the space of consumption sequences {ctT=o, where the consumption set is taken to be R T+ 1. The tildes over the variables Rt and Qvt are used to denote the assumption that they are random variables, and the interpretation of the sequence of constraints (3) is that the individual receives endowments {,UIT1 which may be invested in a single risky asset. The asset at is assumed to pay a gross return Rt, and in general I shall allow for the possibility that the sequences {i,112. and {RWitIT1 are jointly distributed random variables that may take values in R +T. The expectation operator that appears in equation (1) has the interpretation of an expecta-tion taken over the joint probability distribution of {40,R 8.t+1 conditional on the realizations of (G8,R,) for all s ' t.
A solution to equation (1) is represented by a number 'c and a sequence of functions ct: R2t R+,t = 1 ..., T, where ct is interpreted as a contingent plan. It represents a list of actions, one for every possible realization of past values of w and R, that the consumer proposes to undertake in period t.
Stated in this way, this problem is a direct application of expected utility theory which has a distinguished history dating back at least to Bernoulli. But the application of expected utility theory to the choice of intertemporal consumption sequences makes no reference to the temporal nature of the consumer's problem. The axioms of atemporal expected utility theory are typically justified by an appeal to simple thought experiments in which it is suggested that a violation of one or other of the VNM axioms would be irrational; the discussion of the Allais paradox in Raiffa [1970, pp. 80 ff] is a good example of this approach. But temporal versions of such arguments are not as compelling as their atemporal counterparts. The KP framework provides a rationalization of a violation of the VNM axioms that can be directly traced to the sequential nature of decisions.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE KREPS-PORTEUS AXIOMS TO THOSE OF VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN
Kreps and Porteus provide two alternative axiomatizations of their approach. One set of axioms views choice as a sequence of decisions. At each stage in the sequence, the agent ranks alternative pairs of payoffs; each such pair consists of a current consumption bundle and a ticket to a lottery that will take place in the following stage. The prizes in the lottery represent the maximum possible utilities that the agent could hope to achieve in different states of nature. In this formulation of the problem, preferences for onestep-ahead lotteries obey the complete set of VNM axioms. The sequence of one-step decision problems is knitted together with a time consistency axiom. KP also provide a second formulation of the agent's preference ordering in which axioms are formulated directly over a space of temporal lotteries. For the sake of completeness, a description of this second approach is provided below.
To describe the KP axioms, it is necessary to introduce some notation. Let dT be a probability distribution over CT, and let DT be the set of all such distributions. One may think of the individual, at 46 Q UAR TERL Y JO URNAL OF ECONOMICS the beginning of period T, expressing preferences over lotteries for period T consumption; these lotteries are the elements of DT. Now imagine the individual who stands at the beginning of period T -1. This person must express preferences over uncertain gambles which may resolve partly in T -1 and partly in period T. In the VNM approach these preferences are defined by formulating axioms over the set of lotteries that yield a compound prize of consumption commodities, part of which is paid in period T -1 and part of which is paid in period T. In the KP approach preferences are defined over a more complicated object; that is, the set of lotteries that yield an uncertain consumption payoff in period T -1 and a ticket to another lottery that takes place in period T. In the absence of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, these approaches are not identical.
To formalize this idea, one defines recursively the sets, {Dtt?T-1, of probability distributions over R+ x D,+1. For example, an element of DT-1 is a probability distribution, dT-l, which represents the probability of receiving consumption cT1 in conjunction with the lottery ticket dT. The payoff to the lottery dT-2 is the pair
which is an element of R+ x DT-1 Carrying this recursion backwards, one arrives at the set of temporal lotteries DO, which is the basic space over which the KP axioms are defined.
An additional piece of notation is required in order to characterize those subsets of DO that describe the possible positions at which a decision maker may find him or herself at a given point in time. Let ht {co,c1,... , ctj be a consumption history. Now define the set Pt(ht) to consist of those lotteries in Do for which the decision maker will receive the history ht with probability one. An element of Pt(ht), denoted pt(ht), will give the decision maker a nonstochastic consumption sequence, ht, and a ticket to a lottery dt+1 EDt+1. Notice that if one denotes the first k elements of ht by hk(ht), then Pk(hk(ht)) D Pt(ht). This follows since one of the possible sequences of lotteries that leads from k to t is the sequence in which the decision maker receives the realizations {ck+1,. . ., Cd with probability one. It follows that Pt-1(ht -1(h t)) D Pt(ht) and, by induction, that the sets {Pt(ht)}IT 1 are all contained in DO.
The key difference between the KP and VNM representations of choice hinges on an agent's attitude toward the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Imagine standing at the beginning of period 0 and choosing between two elements of Pt(ht) for some t > 0. Each of these lotteries contains the same nonstochastic consumption sequence up to date t but possibly different distributions over RINCE PREFERENCES 47 uncertain events that resolve beyond date t. Now think of mixing two of these lotteries by flipping a coin that comes up heads with probability a and tails with probability 1 -a but flip the coin at date k < t. This new mixture is an element of Pk(hk), where hkhk(ht). Let the mixed distribution be represented by the quadruple (k,a;p,p') where p and p' are elements of Pt(ht). A decision maker whose preferences admit an expected utility representation over consumption sequences must be indifferent to the timing of the coin flip in the experiment described above. A KP individual may, on the other hand, prefer either early or late resolution of uncertainty. The following three axioms characterize KP choice.
Al. There exists a complete transitive ordering, a, over the elements of Do. 
A2. The relation, a, is continuous on

., T -1
Equation (10) differs from the VNM approach (equation (7)) in that vt is nonlinear in the expectation operator Et. This generalization would appear to complicate the problem and make things more, rather than less, difficult. However, by choosing the function w correctly, one can find a class of decision problems that yield closed-form solutions in a wide variety of situations.
I shall return to the value function approach in Section VII in which I define a class of preferences that admit closed-form representations for the sequence of functions {vt}. Before taking up this issue, however, I shall explore an alternative representation of choice that permits a more direct comparison of the KP approach with the expected utility framework. This representation is the KP analogue of the expected utility index.
V. THE UTILITY INDEX
In this section I introduce the appropriate notion of the utility index for KP choice. In the case of VNM preferences the utility 50 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS index is a function that takes, as its domain, the cartesian product of the real line with the space of probability distributions over RT. Current consumption is an element of R+, and lotteries over future consumption sequences are elements of the set of probability distributions over RT. Decision making under uncertainty is frequently represented as the choice of a set of contingent plans that maximizes such an index subject to a sequence of constraints, that is, in the form of equation (1).
From the perspective of a decision maker at date 0, the utility index for this problem is given by the function, The index Ut maps from the space R+ x Dt+1 to the real line, and it is the KP analogue of the VNM index defined in equation (12). The structure of this index is closely related to a class of preferences over nonstochastic sequences that Lucas and Stokey [1984] refer to as recursive. Koopmans [1960] was the first to study preferences in this class, and in view of the similarity of equation (15) to the Koopmans class I shall refer to w:R+ x R -R as an aggregator function. Recursive preferences are easy to study because they allow one to construct a solution to a programming problem in steps using Bellman's principle of optimality. One is entitled to ask why the theory of choice under uncertainty should be complicated by introducing the concept of temporal lotteries. Why not stick to the more basic choice objects, that is, to lotteries over consumption sequences? The answer is that the concept of temporal lotteries allows one to separate risk from intertemporal preferences while retaining the very useful property of recursivity.
What would happen if the assumption of recursivity were to be relaxed? A natural way of generating a change in an agent's attitude to risk without affecting his or her ordinal ranking of nonstochastic sequences would be to apply the multicommodity analysis discussed in Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] By varying the curvature of HF, one could make the individual more or less risk averse without changing his or her preferences over nonrandom sequences. But the cost of this approach is that an agent's relative ranking of choices at date t necessarily depends on the entire history of past consumptions and on all of the possible choices that might be made in the future. KP preferences allow one to break the link between risk and intertemporal substitution without giving up on recursivity.
Recursive preferences are defined in the nonstochastic environment by the assumption that the decision maker's ranking over future consumption sequences is independent of his or her ranking over current consumption bundles. The natural extension of this property to choice over temporal lotteries leads to the sequence of recursive indices defined by equations (14) and (15). It is the property of independence of future decisions from events that have occurred in the past that allows one to apply the maximum principle of dynamic programming to choice problems with a recursive structure.'
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS VI. A HOMOGENEOUS CLASS OF PREFERENCES
In this section I introduce a class of preferences for which the utility index U, is homogeneous of degree y in current consumption and in the value of future state dependent consumption. This class, which has been proposed by Epstein and Zin [1989] , has the convenient property of allowing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be represented by two separate parameters.4 It is capable of capturing the behavior either of an individual who prefers early resolution of uncertainty or of one who prefers late resolution. These preferences are defined by choosing the functions WT and w in equations (14) and (15) The case in which y = 1 is the case that defines RINCE preferences, and it is the only member of this class5 for which one can obtain closed-form solutions to intertemporal stochastic choice problems when there is both rate of return and endowment uncertainty. For the special case in which there is no uncertainty, the KP utility index that is induced by equations (17) and (18) takes the degenerate form, in the recursive equations that are used to construct the utility index U0. If there is no uncertainty, then these terms collapse. The special case of y = 1 corresponds to a type of risk neutrality, and it is this property that enables one to generate closed-form solutions.
Kreps and Porteus show that the decision maker will prefer early (late) resolution of uncertainty if the aggregator function w(x,y) is convex (concave) in its second argument. For the class of homogeneous preferences described above, it follows that a preference for early (late) resolution occurs if p > -y(p < y). Since p is bounded above by 1, it follows that the risk-neutral decision maker must prefer late resolution.
What is going on here? A priori-it seems plausible that a risk-neutral agent could also prefer early resolution of uncertainty. But our concept of risk neutrality, in which the value function is linear in the appropriate measure of expected human wealth, excludes this possibility. What seems to be happening is that the curvature of the period utility function, when preferences are von Neumann-Morgenstern, provides a natural planning advantage to early resolution. That is, VNM preferences generate value functions in which an agent has a natural preference for early resolution of income lotteries. In order to counteract this natural tendency for prefering early resolution, the agent's preferences over consumption lotteries must incorporate a basic desire for late resolution.6
VII. THE PARAMETERIZATION OF RINCE PREFERENCES
In this section I describe the class of preferences that I call RINCE, and in Section VIII I derive an exact solution for the sequence of consumption decisions that would be taken by a decision maker whose preferences were of this type. RINCE preferences are members of the homogeneous class described in Section 6. Although a preference for late resolution of uncertainty is not necessarily unreasonable, it may have some counterintuitive implications. For example, a referee has pointed out to me that, in the case in which T = 1 (2 periods), all wealth is nonhuman, p > 1/2, and Sy = 1, it can be shown that an agent would strictly prefer not to be told the realization of the rate of interest before making his or her consumption decision for the first period. This preference occurs even though the information would be used to alter the agent's decision if it were available. One must be careful, when using RINCE preferences, to make sure that the context in which they are applied makes economic sense. VI for which the homogeneity parameter y is equal to one. The decision rule that describes optimal behavior in any period is constructed by solving the sequence of value functions described in equations (9), (10), and (11) when the functions WT 7. The restriction to discount rates less than one is not necessary for the finite horizon case.
The time-dependent aggregator given by equation (26) generates a sequence of utility indices, each of which is equivalent (up to a linear transformation) to the sequence of indices that is generated by the time-independent aggregator given in equation (22). When there is no uncertainty, the date 0 values of these utility indices are given by equations (24) and (23), respectively. Since the timeindependent parameterization is notationally more compact, it seems preferable to work with the time-independent aggregator, equation ( Recall that L'Hospital's rule applies to the limit of the ratio of two functions, each of which converges to zero (or infinity). The coefficients on x and y must sum to unity in order for the numerator of the CES aggregator to converge to zero as p converges to 0.
